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CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN PRIVATE LITIGATION: 
BALANCING INTERESTS IN ANONYMITY AND DISCLOSURE 
 
Heightened pleading standards and limits on discovery in private 
securities fraud actions make confidential informants crucial in many 
cases. While courts have widely recognized the importance of 
confidential informants and the need to protect them from retaliation, 
they have not applied consistent standards for how informants must be 
identified in pleadings, and have failed to take into account substantial 
bodies of relevant caselaw when deciding whether to require that 
informants’ names be disclosed in discovery.  
 This article offers a framework for when and how confidential 
informants should be identified, taking into account the competing 
interests in anonymity and disclosure. It offers a refined standard for 
identifying informants at the pleading stage that focuses on how the 
employee came to have the information pleaded, rather than on the 
employee’s job title or duties. It also proposes use of in camera review of 
witness statements. 
 At the discovery stage, this article criticizes the use of the 
attorney work product doctrine as a basis for protecting informant 
identities. It argues that courts should perform a balancing analysis that 
directly weighs public policy and privacy interests in favor of informant 
anonymity against defendants’ legitimate needs for disclosure. This 
approach is supported by numerous cases protecting the identities of 
informants and other types of witnesses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), and 
also finds support in the many cases construing the formal privilege 
applicable to government informants.  
 Finally, this article encourages plaintiffs to seek protective 
orders for informants early in litigation and briefly discusses protection 
for witness interview notes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Confidential informants are crucial to detecting and prosecuting 
corporate wrongdoing.1 The threats of retaliation and harm to reputation, 
however, serve as strong disincentives to corporate employees who 
 
1 See Part I.A. infra.
2consider stepping forward.2 While individuals who report misconduct to 
the government can generally rely on the “informant’s privilege” to 
preserve their anonymity, no similar privilege shields the identities of 
informants who speak to private plaintiffs or their counsel. As plaintiffs’ 
law firms – particularly in securities cases subject to the heightened 
pleading standards – have hired professional investigators and 
significantly expanded their pre- and post-filing investigations, the 
proper treatment of such private confidential informants has become 
increasingly important. Striking the proper balance between protecting 
informants’ identities and fair disclosure to defendants now has 
significant consequences for plaintiffs, defendants, private litigation as a 
means of enforcing the nation’s laws, the legal system’s commitment to 
broad discovery, and informants’ ability to perform their civic duty 
without professional martyrdom. 
 The competing interests in shielding and disclosing informants’ 
identities arise at three distinct stages of litigation:  
 • At the pleading stage, when informants’ statements are used to 
establish the legal sufficiency of a claim and defend a motion to dismiss, 
particularly in securities cases subject to the heightened pleading 
standards imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
19953 (“PSLRA”) and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedures.  
 • During discovery, when Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) requires that the 
names of individuals “likely to have discoverable information” be 
provided and defendants’ interrogatories often specifically request 
disclosure of plaintiffs’ confidential informants.  
 • On a motion for summary judgment or at trial, when an 
informant’s testimony is proffered to a judge or jury for use in 
determining the merits of the controversy.  
 This article analyzes courts’ treatment of confidential informants 
at each of these stages. Part I evaluates confidential informants’ value in 
enforcement actions and informants’ need for anonymity. Parts II-IV 
addresses the pleading, summary judgment/trial, and discovery stages, 
respectively.  
 
2 See Part I.B. infra.
3 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 
and 18 U.S.C.). 
3At the pleading stage, courts shield informants’ names but require 
the plaintiff to provide some identifying information. Modest differences 
in courts’ formulations of what information must be disclosed, however, 
significantly affect the protection that informants receive. In camera 
review of witness statements and supporting documentation provides one 
mechanism, proposed infra, for insuring that meritorious securities fraud 
cases proceed while protecting defendants from unsupported claims.  
 At the trial stage, the rule is simply stated: informants must 
always be named.  
 Finally, the discovery stage presents the most difficult issues in 
balancing the competing interests in anonymity and disclosure. The 
securities fraud cases on point have reached inconsistent results, and 
have generally failed to consider (or even acknowledge) the extensive 
caselaw governing the informant’s privilege and the balancing analysis 
that courts use in other cases where public policy and privacy interests 
support protecting the identities of informants and other types of 
witnesses. Collectively, these cases provide a coherent and nuanced 
framework for balancing the competing interests in anonymity and 
disclosure for confidential informants in securities fraud and other 
private litigation. 
I. THE VALUE OF INFORMANTS AND THE NEED FOR PROTECTION 
A. The Importance of Confidential Informants in Prosecuting Violations 
of Law 
 Informants serve a crucial role in detecting and prosecuting 
wrongdoing. They have been described by a former FBI Director as “the 
single most important tool in law enforcement”4 and have been 
recognized by the Supreme Court as “a vital part of society’s defensive 
arsenal.”5 Even commentators who are critical of informant-related 
abuses recognize informants as “a necessary evil.”6 Informants can be 
divided into two categories: the “vast majority”7 who “trade[] 
 
4 ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS 
IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 158 (2002) (quoting William Webster). 
5 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967). 
6 Bloom, supra note 4, at 158. 
7 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5702, at 354 (1992). 
4information for money or immunity from prosecution,”8 and citizen 
informants, who “get[] nothing but an assurance of anonymity in return 
for the information provided.”9 Corporate employee-informants, also 
called whistleblowers, are generally citizen informants, and perform 
what is arguably an especially important role by reporting wrongdoing 
that can inflict widespread harm and could otherwise be nearly 
impossible to detect.10 
The importance of informants in securities law enforcement is 
illustrated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200211 (“SOX”) and the events 
leading to its enactment. The popular press extensively reported on the 
efforts of Sherron Watkins, a mid-level manager at Enron Corp., to 
report suspected fraud at the company,12 and she was cited in SOX’s 
legislative history.13 In turn, SOX has been described as “us[ing] 
whistleblower protection as a key component of enforcement of federal 
securities laws.”14 SOX mandated a variety of measures to support and 
protect employees who report wrongdoing. First, it required audit 
committees to “establish procedures for . . . the confidential, anonymous 
submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding 
questionable accounting or auditing matters.”15 Second, SOX enacted 
severe criminal penalties – comparable to those for witness tampering16 – 
for “interference with the lawful employment or livelihood” of 
 
8 Id. at 338. 
9 Id. at 339. 
10 See MARLENE WINFIELD, Whistleblowers as Corporate Safety Net, in 
WHISTLEBLOWING – SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 21-31 (Gerald 
Vinten ed., 1994). 
11 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 
15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
12 See, e.g., Don Van Natta Jr. & Alex Berenson, Enron’s Collapse: The 
Overview; Enron’s Chairman Received Warning about Accounting, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 15, 2002, at A6.  
13 S. Rep. No. 107-146 (2002). 
14 DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING:
THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE vii (2d ed. 2004). 
15 SOX § 301, amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(4) (2002). 
16 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2002). 
5employees who provide information relating to a federal offense.17 
Finally, SOX established a civil remedy for employees of public 
companies who are the subject of retaliation. The statute18 prohibits 
public companies19 and their employees and agents from 
“discriminat[ing]” against an employee who provides information or 
otherwise assists an investigation by federal investigators, Congress, or 
the company itself into violations of (i) criminal mail, wire, bank or 
securities fraud statutes,20 (ii) “any rule or regulation of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission,” or (iii) “any provision of Federal law 
relating to fraud against shareholders.” Significantly, the statute also 
affords the same protections to employees who “file, cause to be filed, 
testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding” relating to the 
same subjects.21 By its terms, this provision provides protection for 
individuals who participate in or otherwise assist private securities fraud 
actions. 
 Informants are especially valuable in private securities litigation. 
Because such cases are subject to a heightened pleading standard22 and 
are subject to a discovery stay until the plaintiff has overcome a motion 
to dismiss,23 informants are virtually the only means of obtaining non-
public evidence of wrongdoing at a company and are often essential for 
avoiding early dismissal of an action.  
B. Informants’ Need for Protection 
 The prevalence of retaliation against informants is widely 
acknowledged. SOX is only the most recent statute to prohibit retaliation 
against employees who report wrongdoing. By current count, thirty-five 
other federal statutes also contain explicit provisions protecting public 
 
17 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2002). 
18 SOX Section 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2002). 
19 Companies “with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l), or that is required to file 
reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 
78o(d)) . . . .” Id. 
20 Id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344 and 1348 (2002), 
respectively). 
21 SOX § 806(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(2) (2002). 
22 See infra Part II.  
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b)(1) and 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2002). 
6and/or private employees from retaliation for reporting violations of 
laws, including numerous environmental statutes, laws governing other 
aspects of public health and safety, laws encouraging disclosure of 
public fraud and waste, and laws regulating the workplace,24 most 
notably the Fair Labor Standards Act25 (“FLSA”). In addition, forty-
seven states have enacted statutes protecting public sector 
whistleblowers and seventeen states also provide some statutory 
protection for private sector employees who report illegal conduct.26 
In addition to statutory provisions, the Supreme Court has held 
that the First Amendment protects public sector employees who criticize 
their employers,27 and courts in many states have extended common law 
protection to employees who allege retaliation in response to their efforts 
to prevent or disclose unlawful practices.28 
Summing up the policy underlying all of these protections in a 
case under the FLSA, the Supreme Court observed that “it needs no 
argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to 
induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept” misconduct by their 
employers.29 
Courts have also recognized that the chilling effect of possible 
retaliation extends to former employees of a company. In Hodgson v. 
Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc.,30 the Fifth Circuit 
pointedly rejected the district court’s conclusion that the possibility of 
retaliation against former employees in an FLSA enforcement action was 
“remote and speculative.” The court noted that (i) employers “almost 
invariably require prospective employees to provide the names of their 
previous employers as references when applying for a job,” (ii) a former 
employee “may be subjected to retaliation by his new employer if that 
employer finds out that the employee has in the past” cooperated in an 
 
24 Westman & Modesitt, supra note 14, Appendix C. 
25 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000). 
26 Westman & Modesitt, supra note 14, at 67, 77. 
27 The leading case is Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 
(1968). 
28 Westman & Modesitt, supra note 14, at 132-38. 
29 Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). 
30 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1972). 
7enforcement action, and (iii) a former employee “may find it desirable or 
necessary to seek reemployment with the defendant.”31 
While SOX provides important remedies for informants faced 
with retaliation, federal courts have repeatedly recognized that “the most 
effective protection from retaliation is the anonymity of the informer.”32 
As the Ninth Circuit has observed, informants (or informers33) are far 
better served “by concealing their identities than by relying on the 
deterrent effect of post hoc remedies under [a statutory] anti-retaliation 
provision.”34 Other courts have consistently agreed.35 
Briefly stated, many employees will step forward only if their 
anonymity is assured. As a result, developing appropriate legal standards 
to govern disclosure of informants’ identities is crucial to obtaining their 
assistance in the detection and prosecution of corporate wrongdoing. 
 
31 Id. Accord Martin v. New York City Transit Authority, 148 F.R.D. 56, 
63 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Hodgson). 
32 Wirtz v. Cont’l Fin. & Loan Co. of West End, 326 F.2d 561, 563-
64 (5th Cir. 1964). 
33 Courts use the terms “informer” and “informant” interchangeably. See 
26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7, § 5702, at 338. For consistency, this 
article uniformly uses the term “informant.” 
34 Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 
35 See Dole v. Local 1942, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 
372 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The most effective means of protection, and by derivation 
the most effective means of fostering citizen cooperation, is bestowing 
anonymity on the informant, thus maintaining the status of the informant’s 
strategic position and also encouraging others similarly situated who have not 
yet offered their assistance.”) and Mitchell v. Roma, 265 F.2d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 
1959) (“The statutory prohibition against retaliation provides little comfort to 
an employee faced with the possibility of subtle pressures by an employer, 
which pressures may be so difficult to prove when seeking to enforce the 
prohibition.”). Accord NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 
239-40 (1978) (“Respondent’s argument that employers will be deterred from 
improper intimidation of employees who provide statements to the NLRB by 
the possibility of an [anti-retaliatory] charge misses the point of Exemption 
7(A); the possibility of deterrence arising from post hoc disciplinary action is 
no substitute for a prophylactic rule that prevents the harm to a pending 
enforcement proceeding which flows from a witness’ having been 
intimidated.”). 
8II. PROTECTION FOR INFORMANTS AT THE PLEADING STAGE 
The protection of informants first arises at the start of litigation, 
when the complaint is drafted. In most types of cases, there is no basis 
for requiring a complaint to name confidential informants, or even to 
indicate that informants were the source of the complaint’s allegations. 
In securities fraud cases, however, the PSLRA requires that a complaint 
“state with particularity all facts” supporting an allegation that a 
statement was misleading.36 Rule 9(b), similarly, requires that “the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity.”  
A. Courts Agree that Informants Need Not Be Named in a Securities 
Fraud Complaint 
 While the phrase “all facts” could be construed to require that all 
sources be named and a few early district court cases so held,37 most 
circuit courts have now considered the issue and all have ruled that 
informants need not be identified by name. Recognizing that such a 
requirement “could deter informants from providing critical information 
to investigators in meritorious cases or invite retaliation against them,” 
the Second Circuit held in the leading case of Novak v. Kasaks38 that 
“our reading of the PSLRA rejects any notion that confidential sources 
must be named as a general matter.”39 Novak’s approach has been 
endorsed by the First,40 Third,41 Fifth,42 Seventh,43 Eighth,44 Ninth45 and 
 
36 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2002). 
37 See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 764 (N.D. 
Cal. 1997); In re Nice Sys., Ltd. Sec. Litig., 135 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2001). 
38 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000). 
39 Id. at 313.  
40 In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F3d 11, 28-30 (1st Cir. 2002). 
41 Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 146-47 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
42 ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 351-52 (5th 
Cir. 2002). 
43 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 596 (7th 
Cir. 2006) 
44 Florida State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 
667-68 (8th Cir. 2001). 
45 In re Daou Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005). 
9Tenth46 Circuits. In four of these decisions, the circuit courts also 
specifically endorsed the Second Circuit’s concern that naming 
informants could have a chilling effect.47 The Seventh Circuit, for 
example, observed that “[a] bright line rule obligating the plaintiffs to 
reveal their sources has the potential to deter informants from exposing 
malfeasance. Such a rule might also invite retaliation.”48 
B. Courts Disagree About How Informants Should Be Identified 
 While courts now uniformly agree that confidential informants 
need not be identified by name in a complaint, the circuit courts do not 
agree on the type of identifying material that must be supplied. In Novak,
the Second Circuit required that confidential sources be “described in the 
complaint with sufficient particularity to support the probability that a 
person in the position occupied by the source would possess the 
information alleged.”49 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have adopted this 
formulation.50 The First Circuit, by contrast, calls for “evaluation, inter 
alia, of the level of detail provided by the confidential sources, the 
corroborative nature of the other facts alleged (including from other 
sources), the coherence and plausibility of the allegations, the number of 
sources, the reliability of the sources, and similar indicia.”51 The Third 
Circuit has adopted substantially the same criteria as the First Circuit,52 
and the Ninth Circuit has also approved use of the First Circuit’s criteria 
to “augment[]” the Second Circuit’s approach in Novak.53 The Tenth 
Circuit has adopted the loosest standard, rejecting a “per se rule that a 
plaintiff’s complaint must always identify the source” in any manner.54 
Under the Tenth Circuit’s approach, source information is more 
 
46 Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1101 (10th Cir. 2003). 
47 In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F3d 11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002); Cal. Pub. 
Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Tchuruk, 291 F.3d at 352-53; Makor, 437 F.3d at 596. 
48 Makor, 437 F.3d at 596. 
49 216 F.3d at 314. 
50 Makor, 437 F.3d at 596 (quoting Novak); Tchuruk, 291 F.3d at 353 
(adopting a substantially identical formulation). 
51 Cabletron, 311 F.3d at 29-30. 
52 Chubb, 394 F.3d at 147. 
53 Daou, 411 F.3d at 1015. 
54 Kinder-Morgan, 340 F.3d at 1101. 
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important for allegations that “are difficult to verify, such as allegations 
of secret meetings, the contents of private conversations, or alleged 
motivations,” than for allegations that “may be objectively verifiable,” 
such as “specific contract terms, the financial result of a transaction, or 
specific prevailing market conditions.”55 
The manner in which informants are identified is important. 
Practice teaches that defendants often devote significant effort to 
ferreting out informants and are frequently successful in their efforts. 
Executive suites – where most actionable frauds are perpetrated – are 
small enough at most public companies that a job title or description of 
responsibilities will be the equivalent, for the insiders who matter, of 
naming the witness. At the same time, identifying an informant by job 
title or responsibilities poorly serves defendants’ interest in protection 
against meritless claims. As one court has noted, job titles convey little 
about actual job duties,56 and formal job duties often say little about 
whether an employee would have been privy to senior-level 
communications evidencing actionable misconduct.  
 Of greater relevance than an employee’s job title or duties is an 
explanation of how the employee came to have the information pleaded. 
Junior employees in unlikely positions can provide credible (albeit 
hearsay) evidence of wrongdoing through friendship with a strategically-
placed coworker. At the same time, a well-placed senior executive might 
have come to particular knowledge through unreliable office gossip, to 
which a court ought assign little weight.  
 The better approach is therefore to require specificity as to how 
the source came to possess the information pleaded, such as that the 
witness had direct access to relevant communications as a part of her job 
responsibilities or that the witness learned of the relevant facts through a 
close relationship with a co-worker who was directed to execute a part of 
the scheme. 
 This analysis is consistent with each of the appeals courts’ 
formulations cited supra. It fits well with the “totality of the 
circumstances” approaches of the First, Third, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, 
and also conforms to the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ approach 
 
55 Id. 
56 In re Northpoint Commc’ns Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 221 F. Supp. 2d 
1090, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
11
(applying the light gloss of reading “position” in the sense of “situation” 
as opposed to “post of employment”57). 
C. In Camera Review of Witness Interview Notes Serves the Interests of 
Plaintiffs, Defendants and the Court 
 Whatever test is applied, determining the appropriate level of 
detail to use in describing informants remains a challenge for plaintiffs. 
The degree of particularity required to survive a motion to dismiss varies 
from judge to judge, based both on individual assessments of what 
“particularity” means and, inevitably, on the judge’s perception of the 
merits of the case. A plaintiff who provides too much detail risks 
“outing” its informants; a plaintiff who provides too little risks dismissal 
of the cause. The same drafting problem applies to supporting 
documentation, such as an incriminating email that reflects which 
recipient’s copy has been printed. 
 One remedy is for plaintiffs to proffer witness statements and 
supporting documentation for in camera review. In camera inspection of 
materials is, of course, “well established in the federal courts”58 in 
connection with claims of privilege, and has been strongly endorsed by 
the Supreme Court in that context.59 
Although supplementing a complaint with materials supplied in 
camera and ex parte is rare at best,60 this fact is unsurprising given the 
norm of simple notice pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and the recent 
vintage of widespread use of informants in private litigation. While 
“‘[o]ur adversarial legal system generally does not tolerate ex parte 
determinations on the merits of a civil case,’”61 similar concerns are not 
 
57 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
1413 (3d ed. 1996). 
58 United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 569 (1989).  
59 Kerr v. District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1976) (“this Court has 
long held the view that in camera review is a highly appropriate and useful 
means of dealing with” certain claims of privilege). See also Zolin, 491 U.S. at 
568-69 (“this Court has approved the practice of requiring parties who seek to 
avoid disclosure of documents to make the documents available for in camera 
inspection”).  
60 Our research, in fact, found no reported examples. 
61 Vining v. Runyon, 99 F.3d 1056, 1057 (11th Cir. 1996) (summary 
judgment motion, quoting Application of Eisenberg, 654 F.2d 1107, 1112 (5th 
12
implicated at the pleading stage. In addition, criminal law provides a 
clear precedent for use of ex parte materials supplied in camera to make 
a threshold showing of merit at the commencement of a case: such 
materials are routinely submitted to support the filing of a criminal 
complaint and issuance of an arrest warrant pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.62 Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a), 
an arrest warrant will issue upon “probable cause to believe that an 
offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it . . . .” 
The issuing judge, in turn, determines “probable cause” by considering 
the “totality-of-the-circumstances,” that is, “all the circumstances set 
forth in the [complaint or] affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ 
and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information . . . 
.”63 This determination is ordinarily made on an ex parte basis, and 
indeed often relies heavily on information supplied by anonymous 
informants.64 
The similarity of ex parte probable cause determinations in 
criminal cases to the court’s task in evaluating the sufficiency of a 
securities fraud complaint was noted by the First Circuit in its decision 
approving the use of anonymous informants in securities cases.65 The 
 
Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981) (alteration in original) (emphasis added)). Apparently 
the sole exception, noted in Vining, is when “the submissions involve 
compelling national security concerns or the statute granting the cause of action 
specifically provides for in camera resolution of the dispute.” 99 F.3d at 1057.  
62 The criminal precedent should a fortiori defeat any due process 
concerns, since “the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant may be viewed 
as ‘qualitatively more significant’ than the outcome of civil litigation.” Holman 
v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 947 (6th Cir. 1989). 
63 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 238 (1983). See also United States 
v. Pardue, 385 F.3d 101, 107 (1st Cir. 2004) (evaluating “probable cause” for 
an arrest).  
64 See generally, Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (discussing when use of informants’ 
testimony is permissible); 26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7, § 5714 
(discussing when a criminal defendant is entitled to obtain disclosure of the 
identity of confidential informants whose statements had been used to establish 
probable cause to search or arrest). 
65 In re Cabletron Systems, Inc., 311 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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court described probable cause determinations as a “helpful analogy” to 
evaluating the sufficiency of complaints subject to the PSLRA.66 
In camera review also serves judicial efficiency. The challenges 
of drafting a legally sufficient securities fraud complaint were fairly 
described by the Ninth Circuit in Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, 
Inc.:67 “But how much detail is enough detail? When is an inference of 
deliberate recklessness sufficiently strong? There is no bright-line rule. 
Sometimes it is easy to tell, but often it is not. . . . In this technical and 
demanding corner of the law, the drafting of a cognizable complaint can 
be a matter of trial and error.”68 
The Ninth Circuit cited these challenges as support for its holding 
that plaintiffs should be liberally granted leave to replead in securities 
fraud cases. No party, however, benefits from drafting and briefing 
seriatim amended complaints and motions to dismiss. By allowing 
plaintiffs to present all their supporting materials, in camera review 
reduces the need for trial-and-error pleading and lets the court evaluate 
the sufficiency of a complaint taking into account all support that the 
plaintiff has adduced for its allegations.  
 Finally, the statutory purposes underlying the PSLRA and Rule 
9(b) support use of the in camera device. The PSLRA required detailed 
pleading “to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits.”69 Rule 9(b) similarly 
“gives defendants notice of the claims against them, provides an 
increased measure of protection for their reputations, and reduces the 
number of frivolous suits brought solely to extract settlements.”70 At the 
same time, Congress, in enacting the PSLRA, characterized private 
securities litigation as “an indispensable tool” for injured investors,71 and 
courts have cautioned that they “should be sensitive to the fact that 
 
66 Id. at 30. 
67 316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003). 
68 Id. at 1052. 
69 H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740. 
70 In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 
1997) (Alito, J.). 
71 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 
Conference Report on Securities Litigation Reform, H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 
31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.  
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application of [Rule 9(b)] prior to discovery may permit sophisticated 
defrauders to successfully conceal the details of their fraud.”72 As these 
statements indicate, the PSLRA seeks a balance that excludes 
unmeritorious cases while allowing valid claims to proceed. As the 
Supreme Court held in evaluating claims of privilege, “it would seem 
that an in camera review . . . is a relatively costless and eminently 
worthwhile method to insure that the balance . . . is correctly struck.”73 
III. PROTECTION FOR INFORMANTS AT THE TRIAL AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT STAGE 
Due process mandates a simple rule for disclosure of informants’ 
identities at trial and for summary judgment: absent “acute national 
security concerns,”74 anonymous testimony is never allowed and 
informants’ identities must therefore always be disclosed.75 
72 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1418 (internal quotations 
omitted). See also 2 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 
9.03[1][b] (3d ed. 2006). 
73 Kerr v. District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 405 (1976). 
74 Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1060-61 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (also 
observing “[i]t s a hallmark of our adversary system that we safeguard party 
access to the evidence tendered in support of a requested court judgment. The 
openness of judicial proceedings serves to preserve both the appearance and the 
reality of fairness in the adjudications of United States courts. It is therefore the 
firmly held main rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the 
basis of ex parte, in camera submissions.”). 
75 See Reich v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 58, 
62 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The informer’s privilege does not override the 
government’s duty to disclose the identity of witnesses who will testify at 
trial.”); Hansberry v. Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Home, No. CV-03-3006 (CPS), 
2004 WL 3152393, at *4 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2004) (declining in camera 
review of affidavit proffered on a summary judgment motion); Wirtz v. 
Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc., 327 F.2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1964) (requiring 
disclosure of all witnesses, including confidential informants, shortly before 
trial). Although few decisions squarely address this issue, commentators, 
recognizing the fundamental due process dimension of the issue, describe it as a 
firm rule. See 26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7, § 5710, at 404-05 (“the 
government cannot assert the privilege to refuse to disclose the witnesses it will 
call at trial”); 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
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Whether a witness’ status as an informant need be revealed is less 
clear. One commentator suggests it does, stating that “the fact that he is 
an informer must of course be disclosed as a significant aspect of his 
credibility,”76 while the Fifth Circuit, when confronted with the issue in 
an FLSA case, held that the informants did not need to be identified as 
such when lists of trial witnesses were exchanged.77 
The proper rule should probably depend on the type of informant. 
If an informant receives a tangible benefit, such as money or immunity 
from prosecution, that information clearly goes to the informant’s 
credibility. No similar justification, however, supports identification of a 
citizen informant who receives nothing but an assurance of anonymity. 
IV. PROTECTION FOR INFORMANTS AT THE DISCOVERY STAGE 
Discovery poses the hardest issues in balancing the competing 
interests in preserving informants’ anonymity and compelling their 
disclosure. Absent a “lucky guess” by the defendant, withholding an 
informant’s identity necessarily denies the defendant the chance to 
depose the informant, a result contrary to both the “broad and liberal” 
discovery contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,78 and 
the principle that “the public has a right to every man’s evidence.”79 
When evaluating whether a confidential witness must be 
identified during discovery, it is important to note what is at stake and 
what is not. Because “[t]rial by surprise is no longer countenanced,”80 
510:1 (6th ed. 2006) (“If the government calls the informer at trial, the witness’ 
identity . . . must of course be disclosed”). 
76 Graham, supra note 75, § 510:1. 
77 Wirtz v. Robinson & Stephens, Inc., 368 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1966). 
78 Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 777 (3d Cir. 1999). 
79 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (quoting United States v. 
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940)) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)). 
80 Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1140 (9th Cir. 
2006). See also Brown Badgett, Inc. v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 
1988) (purpose of liberal discovery is to “‘make a trial less a game of blind 
man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to 
the fullest practicable extent’” (quoting United States v. Proctor and Gamble & 
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958))). 
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informants who a party intends to call at trial must be identified in 
response to a proper interrogatory during discovery. 
 Whether the identity of confidential informants can be learned 
through discovery therefore concerns a limited group of individuals: 
those who provided confidential information to the plaintiff or plaintiff’s 
counsel, but who will not later be called as witnesses at trial. While 
limited, protection of this group of informants is crucial. As noted 
supra,81 non-testifying informants are the principal source of non-public 
information that plaintiffs can rely on to meet the heightened pleading 
standards under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA. In addition, informants often 
become willing to testify at trial only after they have developed a rapport 
with counsel and see that their testimony could contribute to successful 
prosecution of the lawsuit. Thus, even in the case of witnesses who later 
agree to testify, plaintiffs are far more likely to persuade a witness to 
have an initial conversation if they can represent that the conversation is 
likely to be protected (or, better yet, is the subject of a protective order, 
as discussed infra82). 
 Disclosure of confidential witnesses in discovery has been the 
subject of reported decisions in a number of securities cases. Until Judge 
Michael Baylson’s decision earlier this year in In re Cigna Corp. 
Securities Litigation,83 however, these cases evaluated protection of 
informants only on the basis of the attorney work product doctrine.84 
While the public interest in confidentiality for informants was discussed 
in some decisions, this interest was evaluated only in the context of 
determining whether the identity of such witnesses constituted protected 
attorney work product.85 
81 See Part I.A. 
82 See Part IV.F. 
83 No. Civ. A. 02-8088, 2006 WL 263631 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2006). 
84 See cases discussed in Part IV.A. infra.
85 In re MTI Technologies Corp. Sec. Litig. II, SACV 00-0745 DOC, 
2002 WL 32344347, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2002); In re Ashworth, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 213 F.R.D. 385, 389 (S.D. Cal. 2002); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 
CIV. A. MDL 1219, 1999 WL 354527, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1999); 
Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C01-
20418JW, 2005 WL 1459555, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005); Miller v. Ventro 
Corp., No. C01-01287 SBA (EDL), 2004 WL 868202, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 
2004). 
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Outside the securities context, however, several courts have 
focused directly on the public policy and privacy interests at stake. Their 
approach is consistent with the substantial bodies of caselaw that 
construe the government informant’s privilege and evaluate the need for 
disclosure of the identities of other types of witnesses in situations where 
public policy or privacy concerns militate against the general policy of 
full disclosure.  
A. Attorney Work Product as a Basis for Protection 
 Securities cases addressing protection of confidential informants 
on the basis of attorney work product split on whether informants’ 
identities must be disclosed. 
 The justification for protecting informant identities as attorney 
work product was best articulated in In re MTI Technologies Corp. 
Securities Litigation II.86 The court noted that the work product doctrine 
generally protects trial preparation materials, and explained that “if the 
identity of interviewed witnesses is disclosed, opposing counsel can infer 
which witnesses counsel considers important, revealing mental 
impressions and trial strategy.”87 
While the MTI decision has persuaded one sister California 
district court,88 attorney work product has not carried the day elsewhere. 
In In re Aetna Inc. Securities Litigation,89 Judge Padova of the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania rejected a claim of work product protection for 
informants’ names, on the grounds that such information either was not 
work product at all, or, in the alternative “at most has minimal work 
product content [and] the need for the information sought outweighs the 
minimal work product content that such information may have.”90 Judge 
Padova’s analysis has persuaded three other district courts in published 
opinions.91 
86 MTI, 2002 WL 32344347. 
87 Id. at *3. 
88 Ashworth, 213 F.R.D. 385. 
89 1999 WL 354527. 
90 Id. at *2. 
91 In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 631 (N.D. Ga. 2002); 
Miller v. Ventro Corp., No. C01-01287 SBA (EDL), 2004 WL 868202 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 21, 2004); and Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. 
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Plaintiffs’ lack of success in invoking the work product doctrine 
is unsurprising considering the doctrine is premised on the principle that 
“it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy”92 and, 
by the express language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), protects only 
“mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories.”93 In this 
framework, there is simply no basis for according weight to the public 
policy in favor of detecting corporate wrongdoing or to informants’ 
privacy interests.  
 In the cases cited supra, the courts have attempted to distinguish 
decisions reaching the opposite result by pointing to the number of 
individuals “likely to have discoverable information”94 who were named 
by the plaintiffs in initial disclosures or in response to interrogatories. In 
Aetna, for example, the court noted that the plaintiffs had named roughly 
750 individuals and observed that “[w]ithout the Court’s intervention, 
Defendants would be forced to engage in a time-consuming and 
expensive effort to ferret out the veritable needle in the haystack.”95 In 
MTI, the court observed that the plaintiffs had listed only seventy-one 
current and former employees, “not even close to the unmanageable 
number present in Aetna.”96 Other courts have held 1,200 and “at least 
165” names to be too many,97 but “approximately 100” to be 
reasonable.98 These attempts to draw a line of demarcation between a 
witness list that hides the ball to an acceptable degree, and one that hides 
the ball too well, are ill-advised. Requiring plaintiffs to name 
confidential informants, but conceal them among other persons with 
knowledge results in an unhappy compromise that forces defendants to 
depose third parties who may only be tangentially involved. Depending 
on the stakes of the litigation and the defendant’s resources, the cost of 
 
Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C01-20418JW, 2005 WL 1459555 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 
2005). 
92 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
93 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). 
94 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). 
95 1999 WL 354527, at *4. 
96 In re MTI Technologies Corp. Sec. Litig. II, SACV 00-0745 DOC, 
2002 WL 32344347, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2002).  
97 Cisco, 2005 WL 1459555, at *5; Miller, 2004 WL 868202, at *1-2. 
98 In re Ashworth, Inc. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 385, 390 (S.D. Cal. 2002). 
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deposing all witnesses may be prohibitive and therefore constitute a de
facto denial of access to the informants. At the same time, hiding 
informants among other witnesses may not provide informants with 
adequate protection. Depending on how plaintiffs derive their list of 
persons with knowledge, even a list of 1,000 names may not effectively 
camouflage a senior informant or one with specialized knowledge or job 
duties. 
 The better approach, set forth infra, is therefore to develop 
principled rules for when informants must be named, and when their 
names may be withheld altogether. Securities plaintiffs’ focus on 
attorney work product simply neglects the established framework for 
recognizing the public policy interests at stake – concerns that have been 
specifically acknowledged, as noted supra,99 by a majority of the circuit 
courts that have considered pleading-stage disclosure of informants in 
PSLRA cases. Outside of the securities context, courts have readily 
acknowledged these interests when asked to shield the identities of 
informants and other individuals, as discussed in Part IV.D., infra.
B. The Informant’s Privilege as Precedent for Protection of Private 
Informants 
 Although not addressed by any of the district court decisions 
discussed in Part IV.A., supra, the identities of confidential government 
informants have been protected since at least the nineteenth century.100 
The Supreme Court first recognized the “informant’s privilege” in its 
current form in 1957, holding in Roviaro v. United States101 that 
informants’ identities were generally not subject to discovery to further 
“the public interest in effective law enforcement.”102 The Court 
explained that “[t]he privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to 
communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-
enforcement officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages 
them to perform that obligation.”103 While described as the “informant’s 
(or informer’s) privilege,” the Court in Roviaro explained that it “is in 
 
99 See Part II.A. 
100 See 26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7, § 5702, at 340-41. 
101 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
102 Id. at 59. 
103 Id. 
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reality the Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the 
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to 
officers charged with enforcement of that law.”104 Consistent with its 
purpose and function, the informant’s privilege is applicable to 
government informants in civil cases, as well as in criminal 
prosecutions.105 
Under Roviaro, the privilege is qualified, and when an 
informant’s identity “is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, 
or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give 
way.”106 In a criminal case, this standard “calls for balancing the public 
interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s 
right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders 
nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of 
each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible 
defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other 
relevant factors.”107 
Unlike most other privileges, such as attorney-client or 
psychotherapist-patient, which broadly protect the contents of 
communications, the informant’s privilege protects only the identity of 
the informant, and shields documents only to the extent they “tend to 
reveal the identity of” an informant.108 Thus, witness statements and 
similar materials are discoverable – subject to redaction to remove 
 
104 Id. 
105 See Brock v. On Shore Quality Control Specialists, Inc., 811 F.2d 282, 
283 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Although Roviaro was a criminal case, the privilege 
uniformly has been applied in civil cases as well.”). A compilation of civil 
cases can be found in Thomas J. Oliver, Annotation, Application, in Federal 
Civil Action, of Governmental Privilege of Nondisclosure of Identity of 
Informer, 8 A.L.R. FED. 6 (1971). 
106 Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61. 
107 Id. at 62. 
108 Id. at 60 (“The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying 
purpose. Thus, where the disclosure of the contents of a communication will 
not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the contents are not privileged.”). 
See also United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing 
Roviaro for this proposition). 
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identifying information, and subject to any other applicable privileges 
and limitations on disclosure.109 
A substantial body of criminal and civil caselaw following 
Roviaro has fully developed the parameters of the privilege. First, 
consistent with the due process principles noted supra, the identity of an 
informant who appears as a witness at trial must virtually always be
disclosed.110 When an informant is not called to testify, cases following 
Roviaro focus principally on the relationship of the informant to the 
crime charged or wrongdoing alleged. Ordinarily, disclosure is required 
in criminal cases if the informant is the only participant other than the 
accused, or is the only witness able to confirm or refute the testimony of 
government witnesses.111 Disclosure is generally not required when the 
informant is a “mere tipster,” even if also a witness to the crime.112 In 
cases that fall between these extremes, courts resort to balancing, as 
prescribed in Roviaro.113 
In civil litigation, claims of privilege arise most often in wage 
and hour cases under the FLSA.114 As in the criminal context, the 
requesting party can override the privilege by showing that its need for 
disclosure outweighs the government’s interest in confidentiality. This 
need is evaluated both by assessing the relationship between the 
 
109 Disclosure of witness interview notes is discussed infra at notes 178-
184 and in the accompanying text. 
110 See notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
111 See United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 920-21 (1st Cir. 1991); 
Suarez v. United States, 582 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring 
disclosure if the informant “played an active and crucial role”). See generally 
Graham, supra note 75, § 510:1 and 26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7, 
§ 5713, at 434-37. 
112 Martinez, 922 F.2d at 921; Suarez, 582 F.2d at 1011. 
113 Suarez, 582 F.2d at 1011; United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (Roviaro balancing is based on “(1) the degree to which the 
informant was involved in the criminal activity; (2) how helpful the informant’s 
testimony would be to the defendant; (3) the government’s interest in non-
disclosure”); 26A Wright & Graham, supra note 7, § 5713, at 438-39. 
114 See 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2019, at 301 n.11 (2d ed. 1994) (collecting 
cases), and the numerous FLSA cases cited in this article. 
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informant and the wrong alleged, as in criminal cases,115 and also by 
directly evaluating the relevancy of the identity of the informant to the 
facts at issue in the case.116 
C. Extension of the Informant’s Privilege to Private Informants 
 The clear and well-defined nature of the informant’s privilege 
invites extension from government informants to those who assist private 
plaintiffs, at least plaintiffs acting as “private attorneys general.” While 
opponents of private enforcement actions argue that they lead to 
excessive litigation, interfere with public enforcement, and lack 
accountability,117 these opponents do not question the significant 
deterrent effect of private litigation, and none of the arguments against 
private enforcement supports depriving plaintiffs of a tool that is 
essential to their ability to detect and gather proof of serious wrongdoing. 
Indeed, the asserted deficiencies of private actions may be ameliorated 
by enhancing plaintiffs’ information-gathering tools.  
 In addition, in the case of private securities fraud actions, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the important role of private 
enforcement actions,118 and Congress, even while imposing limits on 
private actions in the PSLRA, stated in its legislative history that 
 
115 See Suarez, 582 F.2d at 10012 (refusing disclosure of an informant in a 
civil tax enforcement case, noting that he was merely a “marginal observer of 
the activities” of the taxpayers); Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 947 (6th Cir. 
1989) (refusing disclosure in a § 1983 action alleging a wrongful shooting by 
an arresting officer where “[t]here was no indication that the informant was an 
active participant in the burglary or a witness to it”);  
116 Wirtz v. Cont’l Fin. & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1964) (“It 
is perfectly plain that the names of informers are utterly irrelevant to the issues 
to be tried by the trial court.”). Accord Usery v. Ritter, 547 F.2d 528, 531 (10th 
Cir. 1977) and Brock v. On Shore Quality Control Specialists, Inc., 811 F.2d 
282, 284 (5th Cir. 1987). 
117 The literature is summarized in Matthew C. Stephenson, Public 
Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of 
Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 114-20 (2005). 
118 Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 
(1985) (“we repeatedly have emphasized that implied private actions provide ‘a 
most effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the securities laws and are ‘a 
necessary supplement to Commission action.’” (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 
377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964))). 
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“[p]rivate securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which 
defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely upon 
government action. Such private lawsuits promote public and global 
confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to 
guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others 
properly perform their jobs.”119 
Decisions applying the current version of the privilege in civil 
cases further illustrate why extending the informant’s privilege is 
appropriate. Several of these courts have reasoned that “[s]ince the guilt 
or innocence of a criminal defendant may be viewed as ‘qualitatively 
more significant’ than the outcome of civil litigation,” the privilege 
should actually be stronger and yield less frequently in the civil 
context.120 
While informants in civil litigation are less likely to face threat to 
life and limb, courts have recognized that the informant’s privilege 
“[a]lso recognizes the subtler forms of retaliation such as blacklisting, 
economic duress and social ostracism.”121 
The fact that corporate misconduct – particularly, fraud and 
antitrust offenses – regularly gives rise to parallel criminal prosecutions 
and (private) civil cases further supports extension of the privilege and 
 
119 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 
Conference Report on Securities Litigation Reform, H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 
31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.  
120 Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 946 (6th Cir. 1989). See also Dole v. 
Local 1942, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989) (“In 
civil cases the privilege, which limits the right of disclosure usually called for 
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is arguably greater since not all 
constitutional guarantees which inure to criminal defendants are similarly 
available to civil defendants.” (citations omitted)); Management Information 
Technologies, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 151 F.R.D. 478, 483 n.2 
(D.D.C. 1993) (“[i]t would seem rather incongruous for courts to decline to turn 
over such information in proceedings where a defendant’s liberty is at stake 
while providing such materials in a civil setting where monetary damages alone 
are involved”); Matter of Search of 1638 E. 2nd Street, Tulsa, Okl., 993 F.2d 
773, 775 (10th Cir. 1993) (in civil cases, “the informer’s privilege is arguably 
stronger, because the constitutional guarantees assured to criminal defendants 
are inapplicable”). 
121 Dole, 870 F.2d at 372. 
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demonstrates the lack of any good justification for applying different 
rules to governmental and non-governmental informants. It would be 
perverse indeed to hold that an indicted corporate officer facing years in 
prison and the loss of her reputation was barred by the privilege from 
obtaining the identities of informants located by prosecutors while her 
former employer, facing the loss of a few basis points of quarterly 
earnings in a class action, was entitled to broader discovery of the names 
of informants located by plaintiffs’ counsel.  
 While these considerations underscore the appropriateness of 
protecting non-governmental informants in private litigation, the 
Supreme Court’s privileges jurisprudence effectively forecloses formal 
expansion of the informant’s privilege as the means to do so. 
 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that the 
federal law of privileges “shall be governed by the principles of the 
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United 
States in the light of reason and experience.” The Supreme Court has 
recognized that this provision “authorizes federal courts to define new 
privileges.”122 However, the Court has repeatedly confirmed that “the 
public has a right to every man’s evidence”123 and that “there is a general 
duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any 
exceptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many 
derogations from a positive general rule.”124 Accordingly, the Court has 
held that evidentiary privileges “are not lightly created nor expansively 
construed,”125 and has declined most invitations to create or expand 
privileges.126 
122 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996). 
123 Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) 
(quoting 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940)) (internal 
quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)). 
124 Id. (same parenthetical notes) 
125 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).  
126 See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (rejecting academic 
peer review privilege); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980) (rejecting 
privilege for “legislative acts”); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) 
(rejecting claim that in camera review of materials to determine applicability of 
crime-fraud exception would impair attorney-client privilege); Trammel v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (holding that voluntary testimony by spouse 
was not barred by spousal privilege). 
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Under the leading Supreme Court case addressing the creation of 
new privileges, Jaffee v. Redmond, the common law analysis begins with 
an evaluation of the interests supporting the privilege.127 While the 
interests in insuring the free flow of information from informants are 
manifest, they are mitigated by another factor cited later in Jaffee – the 
need for certainty and predictability in application of the evidentiary 
privilege. For many privileges, such as the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege at issue in Jaffee or the spousal privilege recognized in 
Hawkins v. United States,128 the protected communications typically 
occur before litigation has commenced, and potentially before it is even 
anticipated. Accordingly, the interests at stake call for a clear rule to 
guide members of the public in their conduct. By contrast, contacts with 
informants occur in conjunction with litigation. As a result, the relevant 
facts can be presented to the presiding judge for a case-by-case 
determination with little harm to the relevant interests. 
 The other principal factor discussed in Jaffee was the consensus 
among the states.129 Because no state apparently recognizes an 
informant’s privilege for non-governmental informants, this factor 
weighs significantly against the recognition of an expanded privilege. 
The same is true of a third factor discussed in Jaffee – whether the 
privilege was included among those proposed by the Advisory 
Committee on Rules of Evidence in 1969.130 The Advisory Committee 
made no provision for protection of non-governmental informants.131 
While Supreme Court precedents therefore do not support 
expanding the informant’s privilege, other decisions by circuit and 
district courts around the country reflect consistent use of a case-by-case, 
balancing approach to achieve a similar result. 
 
127 518 U.S. at 11. 
128 358 U.S. 74 (1958). 
129 518 U.S. at 12-13. 
130 Id. at 14-15 (citing inclusion of a psychotherapist-patient privilege 
among the Advisory Committee’s proposed rules). 
131 Proposed Rule 510, rejected by Congress, would have codified the 
common law informant’s privilege, but was limited to governmental 
informants. See Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and 
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 255 (1972). 
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D. Balancing the Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure  
 All of the factors mentioned supra: the value of confidential 
informants in enforcement actions, informants’ need for protection, the 
important role of private litigation, and the lack of justification for 
different standards of protection in government and private actions, 
argue in favor of protecting the identities of private confidential 
informants. In the absence of formal privilege, the few courts faced with 
demands for the disclosure of confidential witnesses outside the 
securities arena have provided this protection through a balancing 
analysis. Many other courts have adopted the same approach in other 
situations where public policy and privacy interests support the 
protection of witnesses’ identities. As a number of these cases illustrate, 
balancing is often adopted by courts in lieu of creation of a new 
privilege.132 
132 E.g., Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc., 399 F.3d 391 (1st Cir. 
2005) (rejecting privilege for private informant but remanding so that the trial 
court could perform a balancing analysis); Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. 
Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (rejecting privilege 
for abortion records but quashing subpoena under balancing analysis); In re 
Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting 
that “even where an evidentiary privilege is not available, a party may petition 
the court for a protective order” and remanding for a determination of whether 
such an order was proper); Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163 
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting scholarly journal peer review privilege but 
protecting identity of peer reviewer under balancing analysis), aff’d, 870 F.2d 
642 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 288 n.4 
(4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting medical peer review privilege but noting that an order 
protecting the identities of third parties would be proper); Seales v. Macomb 
Co., 226 F.R.D. 572, 578-79 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (rejecting juvenile records 
privilege but redacting identifying information based on balancing analysis); 
Ross v. Bolton, 106 F.R.D. 22, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that no private 
investigatory privilege existed but protecting investigatory records based on 
balancing analysis). 
 Such balancing differs significantly from the recognition of a new 
privilege because, under Rule 26(c), the party seeking protection bears the 
burden of persuasion, see infra footnote 161 and accompanying text. By 
contrast, in the case of the informant’s privilege, as with others, “the 
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The First Circuit’s decision last year in Gill v. Gulfstream Park 
Racing Ass’n, Inc.133 reflects the proper approach. In Gill, a racehorse 
owner sued a racetrack operator for defamation in connection with a 
private investigation into wrongdoing by the owner. The plaintiff 
subpoenaed documents from a (non-party) trade association that had 
initiated the investigation. The trade association opposed the subpoena 
on the grounds that the documents contained the names of confidential 
informants. The district court held the informant’s privilege inapplicable, 
and declined to protect the identities of the informants.134 The First 
Circuit vacated and remanded. It agreed that the applicable state-law 
informant’s privilege did not apply, but held that the “‘[t]he “good 
cause” standard in [Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)] is a flexible one that requires 
an individualized balancing of the many interests that may be present in 
a particular case.’”135 Under Rule 26(c), “[i]n particular, considerations 
of the public interest, the need for confidentiality, and privacy interests 
are relevant factors to be balanced.”136 By failing to recognize and 
evaluate these interests, the First Circuit held that the district court had 
abused its discretion.137 
A similar approach was adopted by Judge Sporkin in 
Management Information Technologies, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service 
Co.138 There, the defendant sought discovery of sources who had 
allegedly provided the plaintiff with confidential company documents. 
Judge Sporkin discussed at length the risk of retaliation to which 
whistleblowers are exposed, and declined to order disclosure of the 
sources.139 He described his ruling as “based on the Court’s balancing of 
the interest of third parties with the needs of the defendants to defend 
themselves in the present proceeding” and noted that the “identities of 
 
government is granted the privilege as of right.” Dole v. Local 1942, Int’l Bhd. 
of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989). 
133 399 F.3d 391 (1st Cir. 2005). 
134 Id. at 393-94. 
135 Id. at 402 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 165 F.3d 952, 
959-60 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 403. 
138 151 F.R.D. 478 (D.D.C. 1993). 
139 Id. at 481-82. 
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the confidential informants . . . are at best marginally relevant to the 
issues at stake in this litigation.”140 
In In re Cigna Corp. Securities Litigation,141 a securities case, 
Judge Baylson focused directly on the value of and need to protect 
confidential informants, and held that while defendants were entitled to a 
list of all “persons with relevant knowledge,” including all informants, 
plaintiffs were not required to specifically identify their informants from 
among the universe of all persons with knowledge.142 
Numerous other courts faced with discovery requests for witness 
identities have performed similar balancing of public policy and privacy 
interests against defendants’ need for disclosure. Recognizing the 
chilling effect of disclosure of witnesses’ identities on socially-valuable 
speech, courts have protected (i) the identities of doctors who reported 
wrongdoing by a pharmaceutical company sales representative to his 
employer, based on a concern that the representative might “seek reprisal 
against them if he learned their identities;”143 (ii) the identity of a referee 
who evaluated a manuscript for a peer reviewed scholarly journal, based 
on the societal value of the peer review process,144 (iii) the identities of 
judges and attorneys who provided adverse comments to a screening 
committee evaluating the performance of an attorney retained to provide 
services to indigent criminal defendants, based on the “important societal 
interest” of an effective evaluation process and chilling effect of 
disclosures;145 (iv) the identity of a person who reported suspected child 
abuse, based on the societal value of such disclosures and the chilling 
effect of revealing the identity of reporters;146 (v) the identities of doctors 
and hospitals who reported adverse reactions to drugs under a voluntary 
 
140 Id. at 482-83. 
141 No. Civ. A. 02-8088, 2006 WL 263631 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2006). 
142 2006 WL 263631, at *3. 
143 Ramirez v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 425 F.3d 67, 74 (1st 
Cir. 2005). 
144 Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 870 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1989), 
aff’g 121 F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
145 Mitchell v. Fishbein, 227 F.R.D. 239, 245-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
146 DeLeon v. Putnam Valley Board of Education, 228 F.R.D. 213, 217-21 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
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reporting system operated by the Food and Drug Administration;147 the 
(vi) identities of doctors and patients involved in medical peer reviews 
arising from incidents of possible medical error;148 and (vii) the identities 
of academic tenure committee members and evaluators.149 
Courts have also recognized the privacy interests affected by 
disclosure – interests possessed by confidential informants, as 
recognized in Gill150 – and protected individuals’ identities from 
disclosure in a range of situations. Based on privacy concerns, courts 
have protected (i) abortion records identifying patients in litigation with 
the Department of Justice over the constitutionality of anti-abortion 
legislation;151 (ii) the identity of residents in a group home for juveniles 
in a civil rights action arising out of improper conduct by employees at 
the home;152 and (iii) the names of patients in a nursing home in a suit 
alleging overcharging for medications.153 
Citing both public interests and privacy rights, courts have also 
protected the identities of participants in a study sponsored by the Center 
for Disease Control in a products liability action,154 and the names of 
members of a private medical society in an action alleging 
anticompetitive conduct by the society.155 
147 In re Eli Lilly & Co., Prozac Prod. Liab. Litig., 142 F.R.D. 454, 
457 (S.D. Ind. 1992). 
148 Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 288 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001). 
149 Schneider v. Northwestern Univ., 151 F.R.D. 319, 324 (N.D. Ill. 1993); 
Black v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 94 CIV. 9074 (SS) (NRB), 1996 WL 
294310, at *4 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1996). 
150 Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc., 399 F.3d 391, 402-03 (1st 
Cir. 2005). 
151 Northwestern Mem. Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926-27 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
152 Seales v. Macomb Co., 226 F.R.D. 572, 578-79 (E.D. Mich. 2005). 
153 Arenson v. Whitehall Convalescent and Nursing Home, Inc., 161 
F.R.D. 355, 358 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
154 Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546-47 (11th 
Cir. 1985) 
155 Marrese v. American Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 
1159-60 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Posner, J.), rev’d on other grounds, 470 
U.S. 373 (1985). 
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Protection of private confidential informants also finds support in 
cases shielding investigatory materials of private industry trade groups 
that perform a regulatory function. In Ross v. Bolton,156 the court 
recognized that the public interest in effective industry regulation by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers warranted protection for its 
investigative files.157 Similar interests have been recognized, and similar 
protections afforded for investigative files of the New York Mercantile 
Exchange158 and the New York City Board of Trade.159 
One obvious precedent for protecting the identities of private 
informants – the reporter’s privilege – in fact provides little guidance 
because the current status of the privilege is unsettled.160 
E. Balancing as Applied to Confidential Informants 
 To obtain a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c), the moving 
party “‘has the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of 
that order.’”161 To meet this burden, a plaintiff seeking protection for its 
confidential informants is obligated to establish a threshold need for 
 
156 106 F.R.D. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
157 Id. at 24. 
158 Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 110 F.R.D. 490, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
159 DGM Investments, Inc. v. New York Futures Exch., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 
133 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
160 See Wendy N. Davis, The Squeeze on the Press, 91 A.B.A. J., Mar. 
2005, at 22 (describing courts’ recent trend away from protecting journalists). 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision last year in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith 
Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (as reissued Feb. 3, 2006), illustrates the 
current uncertainty surrounding the privilege. After postulating the existence of 
a common law privilege protecting reporters’ confidential sources, the panel 
held that such a privilege would not apply on the facts there. Id. at 1150. In 
separate concurring decisions, two members of the panel then proceeded to 
address whether such a privilege existed – and in carefully-reasoned decisions 
reached opposite conclusions. Id. at 1153-59 (Sentelle, J., holding no such 
privilege exists); id. at 1163-78 (Tatel, J., holding that such privilege does 
exist).  
161 Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953 (1987)). Accord Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion 
Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 1993). See also 6 Moore, supra 
note 72, § 26.104[1], at 26-251. 
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protection. This should ordinarily take the form of an affidavit from an 
investigator averring that one or more persons (i) have informed the 
investigator that they have information concerning suspected 
wrongdoing by the defendant, (ii) are unwilling to provide such 
information due to a fear of retaliation or other injury if their identity is 
disclosed, and (iii) would be willing to provide such information if 
assured that their identity would be shielded from disclosure. 
 As discussed supra,162 Rule 26(c) requires the trial court to 
“undertake ‘an individualized balancing of the many interests that may 
be present in a particular case.’”163 In performing this balancing, 
“[b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or 
articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.”164 
In the case of confidential informants, the public’s interest in 
disclosure of wrongdoing, together with the witness’ privacy interests, 
must be balanced against the defendant’s need to defend the action. 
When balancing these interests, it is important to recognize that the harm 
to be avoided through the order is the danger that potential witnesses will 
refuse to come forward – i.e., the chilling effect of the fear of possible 
retaliation or harm to reputation, and not the threat of actual retaliation or 
other injury to the witnesses themselves. Even if a witness’ fear of 
adverse consequences is unfounded, such fear can nonetheless silence 
the witness and prevent disclosure of the wrongdoing. Accordingly, the 
absence of credible evidence of a threat should not impede issuance of a 
protective order based on a potential witness’ bona fide concerns, as 
presented to the court in an investigator’s affidavit. Focus on chilling 
effect, rather than the actual risk of harm, is consistent with the balancing 
 
162 See Part IV.D. 
163 Diamond Ventures, LLC v. Barreto, 452 F.3d 892, 898 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (quoting In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1211 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (remanding because the district court failed to perform an 
appropriate balancing analysis)). Accord Gill v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 
Inc., 399 F.3d 391, 400-01 (1st Cir. 2005); Chicago Tribune Co. v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Federal 
courts have superimposed a balancing of interests approach for Rule 26’s good 
cause requirement.”). 
164 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986). 
Accord Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2004). See also 6 
Moore, supra note 72, § 26.102[1], at 26-246. 
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cases cited supra, none of which attempted to evaluate whether the fear 
of harm was well-founded.165 The “difficulty of such proof”166 further 
supports this view.  
 After the plaintiff has carried the initial burden of demonstrating 
a need for protection, the analysis performed under Roviaro provides 
well-developed guidance for balancing this interest against both the 
defendant’s interest in effectively opposing the claim and the judicial 
system’s policy in favor of liberal discovery.167 Under Roviaro, as 
discussed supra,168 courts look to the role of the informant, and an 
informant who played an active role in the wrongdoing is far more likely 
to be exposed than one who was a “mere tipster.”169 In civil cases 
involving corporate wrongdoing, courts also directly evaluate the 
relevancy of the information possessed by the informant to the facts at 
issue in the case.170 
Applying these principles, the Fifth Circuit refused to disclose the 
identity of an informant in Brock v. On Shore Quality Control 
Specialists, Inc.,171 a case brought under the FLSA. The court observed 
that “[t]he issue to be tried in this case concerns the nature of the duties 
performed by these individuals, and whether the duties are, as claimed, 
administrative. The list of ‘all persons who have given information to the 
Department of Labor’ is ‘utterly irrelevant to the issues to be tried by the 
trial court.’”172 Similarly, in Usery v. Ritter,173 the Tenth Circuit refused 
disclosure in another FLSA case, noting that “[t]he record contains no 
showing by defendants of their need, or the reasons for their need, of the 
disclosure of the identity of the informants. The defendants know the job 
classifications, the pay rolls, and the type of work done by each 
 
165 See supra notes 143-149 and 154-155. 
166 Dole v. Local 1942, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 870 F.2d 368, 
372 (7th Cir. 1989). 
167 See supra note 78. 
168 See notes 111-116 and accompanying text. 
169 See note 112. 
170 See supra note 116. 
171 811 F.2d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 1987). 
172 Id. at 284 (citing Wirtz v. Continental Finance & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 
561, 563 (5th Cir. 1964)). 
173 547 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1977). 
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employee. The government has specified individuals, classifications, and 
types of machines which it deems pertinent to its case.”174 
In many cases, private informants are similarly situated to the 
government informants in Ritter and On Shore Quality Control. They 
have learned of wrongdoing either because they were personally directed 
to undertake improper actions or because they were informed of 
improprieties by fellow employees. As in the FLSA cases cited, the truth 
is within the knowledge of the defendants, and there is little legitimate 
need to obtain discovery from the informant. There may be situations 
where an informant played an active role in wrongdoing or had 
conversations with senior managers who are no longer available. In these 
situations, disclosure of the informant’s identity may well be required, 
but these instances will be the exception. 
 Thus, in most cases, a balancing analysis under Rule 26(c) will 
support shielding the identities of confidential informants from 
disclosure. 
F. Practice Issues in Protecting Informants’ Identities 
 While protection of informants has often been litigated in the 
context of a Rule 37(a) motion to compel,175 seeking a protective order 
under Rule 26(c) or moving to quash or modify a subpoena pursuant to 
Rule 45(c)(3)176 provides benefits to plaintiffs beyond the usual postural 
advantages. First, a Rule 26(c) motion offers the opportunity to bring the 
importance of informants to the court’s attention early in a case and 
provides the occasion to allow witness statements to be tendered for in 
camera review in advance of a ruling on a motion to dismiss. Second, a 
protective order significantly enhances the ability of plaintiffs’ 
investigators to give comfort to potential informants regarding their risk 
of exposure. It also sets the “ground rules” for initial disclosures under 
Rule 26(a) and later discovery proceedings.  
 
174 Id. at 531. 
175 Each of the decisions in the securities cases discussed in Part IV.A. 
supra involved motions to compel responses to interrogatories. 
176 The Rule 45 motion to quash “is similar to a motion for a protective 
order that discovery not be had under Rule 26(c), and is therefore judged under 
similar standards.” 9 Moore, supra note 72, § 45.50[2], at 45-73 to 45-74. 
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A protective order should provide that the plaintiff may withhold 
the identity of a witness in discovery if the witness requests anonymity, 
provided that the plaintiff discloses the existence of the witness to the 
defendant and reasonably identifies (i) the subject matter of the 
information provided, and (ii) how the source came to possess the 
information provided. 
 Because a defendant may chose to depose a non-party who has 
served as a confidential informant even if the informant has not been 
identified by the plaintiff, the order should also bar the defendant’s 
counsel from inquiring in depositions whether a witness had voluntarily 
initiated contact with the plaintiff or provided information to the plaintiff 
or its investigators.  
 Insuring the flow of information from informants may also 
require an order that confidentiality agreements between the defendant 
and former employees do not bar the employees from providing 
information concerning the misconduct at issue, or that such agreements, 
to the extent they purport to bar communications concerning alleged 
wrongdoing, are void as against public policy.177 A detailed discussion of 
when such orders are appropriate is beyond the scope of this article. 
G. Protection for Witness Interview Notes 
 As discussed supra, the informant’s privilege extends only to the 
identity of the informant, and shields documents only to the extent they 
tend to reveal the identity of an informant.178 Given the similarity of the 
policies underlying the balancing analysis discussed supra, the 
protection afforded by balancing should not extend further.  
 
177 See In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1137 
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the defendant’s confidentiality agreements were 
“so broad that they cover information that cannot possibly be considered 
confidential. To the extent that those agreements preclude former employees 
from assisting in investigations of wrongdoing that have nothing to do with 
trade secrets or other confidential business information, they conflict with the 
public policy in favor of allowing even current employees to assist in securities 
fraud investigations.”). See also United States v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of 
Am., 350 F. Supp. 2d 765, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (False Claims Act’s “strong 
policy of protecting whistleblowers who report fraud against the government” 
barred counterclaim against employee for breach of confidentiality agreement).  
178 See note 108 and accompanying text. 
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While interests in confidentiality cannot justify withholding 
suitably redacted witness interview notes, such notes are entitled to 
protection as attorney work product, whether recorded by an attorney179 
or an investigator.180 Rule 26(b)(3), which codifies the word product 
doctrine, ordinarily allows disclosure “upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation 
of the party’s case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to 
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” While 
withholding the identity of an informant effectively prevents the 
defendant from obtaining the “substantial equivalent” of the statement by 
way of deposition,181 notes of witness interviews are “opinion work 
product” entitled to heightened protection. In Upjohn Co. v. United 
States,182 the Supreme Court held that “[f]orcing an attorney to disclose 
notes and memoranda of witnesses’ oral statements is particularly 
disfavored because it tends to reveal the attorney’s mental processes”183 
Accordingly, “[n]otes and memoranda of an attorney, or an attorney’s 
agent, from a witness interview are opinion work product entitled to 
almost absolute immunity.”184 
179 Rule 26(b)(3). 
180 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) (“attorneys often 
must rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents in the compilation 
of materials in preparation for trial. It is therefore necessary that the [work-
product] doctrine protect material prepared by agents for the attorney as well as 
those prepared by the attorney himself.”). 
181 See generally 8 Wright, Miller & Marcus, supra note 114, § 2026, at 
375. As a general rule, “discovery of work product will be denied if a party can 
obtain the information he seeks by deposition.” In re Int’l Sys. and Controls 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th Cir. 1982). 
182 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
183 Id. at 399-400. 
184 Baker v. General Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
See also In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir. 2003) (core 
or opinion work product “receives greater protection than ordinary work 
product and is discoverable only upon a showing of rare and exceptional 
circumstances”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Sound public policy warrants protecting the identities of non-
testifying confidential informants from disclosure absent a showing of 
genuine need by the defendant. This principle should be regularly 
applied in securities and other private attorney general litigation. 
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